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CASE COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE INVISIBLE LINE BETWEEN
INTENTIONAL AND UNINTENTIONAL MIRANDA VIOLATIONS
Missouri v. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d 700 (Mo. 2002)*
Melissa A. Register"
Appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for the death of her
son and was sentenced to life imprisonment.' Subsequently, Appellant
appealed to the Court of Appeals of Missouri,2 asserting that her Miranda3
rights had been violated due to improper police interrogation techniques.4
The Court of Appeals of Missouri rejected Appellant's argument5 and
affirmed the trial court's ruling.6 The Missouri Supreme Court granted
transfer,7 and in reversing the Court ofAppeals of Missouri and remanding
Appellant's case for a new trial, HELD, that the intentional violation of
Appellant's Miranda rights rendered her post-warning statement
inadmissible.'

* Editor's Note: This Case Comment received the Huber C. Hurst Award for the
outstanding case comment of Fall 2003.
** This comment is dedicated to my parents, Richard and Joanne Register. Thank you so
much for your unwavering support.
1. Missouri v. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d 700, 701 (Mo. 2002). Appellant, Patrice Seibert,
conspired to murder her son, Donald Rector, as part of a cover-up to hide the death of her other son,
Jonathan. See id. Jonathan, who was severely handicapped due to cerebral palsy, died of natural
causes. Id.
2. Missouri v. Seibert, No. 23729,2002 Mo. App. LEXIS 401, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 30,
2002), rev'd, 93 S.W.3d 700 (Mo. 2002).
3. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4. Seibert, 2002 Mo. App. at * 12. The interrogating officer questioned Appellant for
approximately thirty minutes during which time Appellant confessed. Id. at * 13. After a twenty
minute break, the officer read Appellant her Miranda rights, which she waived and then repeated
her previous confession. Id. at * 14. Appellant argued that this interrogation tactic "purposefully
violated her constitutional rights to due process and her privilege against self-incrimination." Id.
at *12.
5. Id. at *22. After an examination ofexisting precedent and persuasive authority, the Court
of Appeals of Missouri ruled that "[Appellant's] statements must be assessed for voluntariness in
light of all of the circumstances." Id. The Court ofAppeals of Missouri found that Appellant's postwarning confession was voluntary. Id. at *25.
6. Id.at *26.
7. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d at 701.
8. Id. at 707.
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The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution grants a privilege
against self-incrimination.9 The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that
the Fifth Amendment prohibits self-incrimination at trial alone, °
extending the right to periods of custodial interrogation as well." The
Court has also demonstrated a willingness to ensure that the suspect in
custody is fully aware of his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. 12 In Miranda v. Arizona, 3 the Court explicitly detailed
the rights that must be explained to a suspect in police custody prior to any
questioning. "4
In Miranda, the Court considered the need for procedural safeguards
to assure that a suspect in police custody is accorded his or her
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. 5 Petitioner was arrested
and taken in custody to the police station.'6 After two hours of
interrogation, he gave a written confession to the police.' Petitioner,
however, had not been advised that he had the right to have an attorney
present during the questioning.' Petitioner was later found guilty of
kidnapping and rape after his written confession was admitted into
evidence over his objection.' 9 On appeal, the Court reversed the conviction
after concluding that Petitioner's constitutional rights had been violated.20
Justifying the need for procedural safeguards of a suspect's Fifth
Amendment rights, the Court stressed the necessity of a limitation upon
custodial interrogation. 2' A suspect in custody must be apprised of certain
9. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, in relevant part, states that no person
"shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
10. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,444 (1966). The Court defined custodial interrogation
as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or

otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id.
11. See id. at 460-61. The Court noted: "As a practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the
isolated setting of the police station may well be greater than in courts or other official
investigations ..... Id. at 461.
12. See id. at 444.

13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Miranda,384 U.S. at 439.
16. Id. at 491.

17. Id. at 491-92. At the top of the written confession was a typed paragraph stating that the
confession was made voluntarily and with the suspect's full knowledge of his legal rights. Id. at
492. One of the officers stated that he read this paragraph to Petitioner, but only after Petitioner had

orally confessed. Id. at 492 n.67.
18. Id. at 491.
19. Id. at 492.
20. Miranda,384 U.S. at 492.

21. Id. at 447. The Court noted that without such limitations, there would be no deterrent to
objectionable police interrogation tactics. Id.
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rights, the first being the right to remain silent.22 Next, the suspect must be
informed that anything said can and will be used against the suspect in
court.23 Finally, the suspect must be told of his or her right to an attorney,24
and if he or she cannot afford one, that one will be provided.25 The suspect
may waive these rights if he or she so chooses. 26 Thus, in Miranda, as
prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a suspect, the
Court mandated that a clear warning of rights must be given and a waiver
received.27
Analyzing the practical effects of the Miranda warning in Oregon v.
Elstad,2" the Court ruled that the initial failure of the police to administer
the warning does not render post-Mirandastatements inadmissible.29 In
Elstad,law enforcement officers went to Respondent's home to arrest him
for burglary.30 While one officer explained the situation to Respondent's
mother, a second officer questioned Respondent in another room, eliciting
a confession.3 Later, at the police station, Respondent was advised of his
Miranda rights, but chose to waive those rights and make a full
statement." At trial, Respondent objected to the admission of his post-

22. Id. at 467-68. Expanding on the point, the Court stated that a suspect's "age, education,
intelligence, or prior contact with authorities" is not determinative as to whether this warning must
be administered. Id. at 468-69.
23. Id. at 469. The Court expounded on the purpose of this provision as "needed in order to
make [the suspect] aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of foregoing it."
Id.
24. Id. at 471-72. The Court added that this right includes not only consultation with counsel
prior to questioning, but also to have counsel present during the interrogation. Id. at 470.
25. Miranda,384 U.S. at 472-73. Noting that the authorities "have the obligation not to take
advantage of indigence in the administration of justice," the Court continued "[w]ithout this
additional warning, the admonition of the right to consult with counsel would often be understood
as meaning only that he can consult with a lawyer ifhe has one or has the funds to obtain one." Id.
26. Id. at 475. Though finding the burden of proving a waiver of constitutional rights rests
heavily on the government, the Court held that such a waiver is permissible so long as the suspect
"knowingly and intelligently" waives those rights. Id. For example, a suspect may still make an
admissible confession if it is given "freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences." Id.
at 478.
27. Id. at 476. The Court also added that its decision was "not intended to hamper the
traditional function of police officers in investigating crime." Id. at 477.
28. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
29. Id. at318.
30. Id. at 300.
31. Id. at 300-01.
32. Id. at 301.
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Mirandaconfession.33 His objection was overruled, and Respondent was
convicted of burglary.34
In denying Respondent's appeal, the Court distinguished the procedural
Mirandaviolation of Elstadfrom the narrower Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.35 Acknowledging the fallibility of law
enforcement,36 the Court declared that a violation may be remedied by a
careful and thorough administration of the Mirandawarning. The Court
ruled that the relevant inquiry as to whether a post-Mirandaconfession is
admissible turns on its voluntary nature.38
The dissent agreed with Respondent that the post-Mirandaconfession
should have been excluded, expressing concern that the majority was
undermining the purpose of the Miranda warning. 39 Nevertheless, the
Court allowed Respondent's post-Miranda confession and upheld the
conviction. 4° In United States v. Esquilin,4 1 the First Circuit Court of

33. Elstad,470 U.S. at 302. Respondent argued that the prior confession at his house had "let
the cat out of the bag, [thus] tainting his subsequent confession." Id. (citation omitted).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 306. The Court noted that the Miranda exclusionary rule "may be triggered even
in the absence of a Fifth Amendment violation." Id.
36. Id. at 309. The Court advanced:
It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a simple failure to
administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other
circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free
will, so taints the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed
waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period.
Id.
37. Id. at 310-11. The Court first stated: "Of the courts that have considered whether a
properly warned confession must be suppressed because it was preceded by an unwarned but
clearly voluntary admission, the majority have explicitly or implicitly recognized that Westover's
requirement of a break in the stream of events is inapposite." Id. at 310. In these situations, the
Court added, a thorough administration of the Miranda warning "serves to cure the condition that
rendered the unwarned statement inadmissible." Id. at 311.
38. Elstad,470 U.S. at 318. The Court noted that a suspect's release of a "guilty secret" does
not qualify as state compulsion nor does it compromise the voluntary nature of a subsequent
informed waiver. Id. at 312.
39. Id. at 319 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the Court's "marble-palace
psychoanalysis.., demonstrates a startling unawareness ofthe realities of police interrogation ......
Id. at 324. When describing this reality, the dissent imagined the following situation: "Police may
obtain a confession in violation of Miranda and then take a break for lunch or go home for the
evening. When questioning is resumed, this time preceded by Miranda warnings, the suspect is
asked to 'clarify' the earlier illegal confession and to provide additional information." Id. at 330.
40. Id. at318.
41. United States v. Esquilin, 208 F.3d 315 (1st Cir. 2000).
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Appeals reached a similar conclusion, finding that a voluntary postMiranda statement is admissible.42
In Esquilin, Appellant was arrested on charges of drug possession.43
Before being read his Miranda rights Appellant, prompted by questions
from law enforcement, confessed to drug possession." After the Miranda
warning was administered, Appellant verbally waived his rights and
repeated his confession.45 Appellant later sought to suppress the postMiranda confession.46 On appeal, the First Circuit ruled that the postwarning statements had been properly admitted.47
In reaching its decision, the First Circuit relied heavily upon the Elstad
decision in ruling against Appellant.4" Appellant first argued that his prewarning and post-warning statements were indistinguishable due to the
lack of temporal separation.49 However, the First Circuit found that short
of actual coercion, no such distinction exists in Elstad.50 Appellant next
asserted that his pre-Miranda confession was obtained using improper
interrogation tactics, thus irreparably tainting his subsequent post-Miranda
confession. 5 The First Circuit rejected this theory, noting that it ignores
Elstad's overall emphasis on "voluntariness" while relying heavily upon
a piece of vague wording. 52 The Esquilin court discounted Appellant's
argument that improper conduct differs from coercive conduct and upheld

42. Id. at 316.
43. Id. at 317.
44. Id.
45. Id. After a Maine Drug Enforcement Agency agent asked Respondent whether he would
like a lawyer, Respondent stated, "I'll talk to you man to man." Id. Respondent then confessed to
drug possession with the intent to sell the drugs in Maine. Id.
46. Esquilin, 208 F.3d at 317. Respondent preserved the issue for appeal by entering a
conditional guilty plea. Id. at 317-18.
47. Id. at316.
48. See id. at 319-21.
49. Id. at 319. Respondent asserted that "there was only one interrogation with the Miranda
warnings occurring mid-stream." Id.
50. Id. The First Circuit noted: "[A]ithough the elapsed time between interrogations is one
factor that may dissipate the taint of a coerced confession, the lesser taint of a Miranda violation
may be dissipated by subsequent warnings even if the unwarned and warned statements are
obtained during the same interrogation." Id.
51. Esquilin, 208 F.3d at 319-20. Respondent claimed that the deliberate violation of his
Miranda rights constituted per se "improper tactics" as referenced by the Elstad court. Id. at 320.
52. Id.
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post-warning confession,53 despite the intentional
the admissibility of the
54
violation of Miranda.
Similar to the First Circuit in Esquilin, the instant court drew much of
its support from Elstad." However, unlike Esquilin,the instant court found
that an intentional violation of Mirandarendered a post-warning statement
inadmissible.5 6 In its opinion, the majority first examined the purpose and
protections of Miranda,noting that not all violations of the warning result
in the exclusion of a suspect's statement." The instant court referred to
Elstadas an illustration of an unintentional Mirandaviolation that did not
taint a post-warning confession.58 Yet, the majority drew a distinction
between the unintentional violation ofElstad and the intentional violation
of the59 instant case, questioning whether the outcomes should be the
same.

In addition, the instant court debated the merits of the investigating
officer's two-step interrogation technique. 6' After finding an intentional
Miranda violation, the instant court looked to the motive behind the
violation. 6' The instant court found that the officer's intent was to deprive
Appellant of the ability to exercise her constitutional rights.6 2 Moreover,
the instant court considered the close proximity of time and place between
Appellant's pre- and post-Mirandawarning statements as further negating
the voluntary nature of the confession.63
53. Id. The First Circuit stressed that improper and coercive tactics are not "two distinct
categories.., but simply alternative descriptions of the type of police conduct that may render a
suspect's initial, unwarned statement involuntary." Id.
54. Id. at 321. The First Circuit concluded: "The addition of a subjective intent by the officer
to violate Miranda, unaccompanied by any coercive conduct, cannot in itself undermine the
suspect's free will." Id.
55. See generallyMissouri v. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d 700, 703-07 (Mo. 2002).
56. Id. at 701.
57. Id. at 703.
58. See id. at 703-04.
59. Id. at 704.
60. See supratext accompanying note 4. The instant court added that had a Mirandawarning
preceded the interrogation, this would be "a perfectly legitimate technique." Seibert, 93 S.W.3d at
704. However, the instant court believed that"[t]his was undeniably an 'end run' around Miranda."
Id.
61. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d at 705. "The court should ascertain whether the purpose of the
violation was to 'undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free will."' Id. (quoting Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985)).
62. Id. The instant court noted that the interrogator would not have instructed the arresting
officer to withhold Appellant's Miranda warning if this deprivation had not been his intent. Id.
63. Id. Discounting the interrogating officer's reading of the Miranda warning, the instant
court asserted: "Adherence to such formality thirty minutes into the interrogation does not change
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Next, the instant court struggled to distinguish the instant case from
Elstad.64 The majority placed substantial weight on the unintentional
violation of Elstadas distinct from the intentional violation of the instant
case.65 The instant court also noted that the interrogating officer used
Appellant's statements from the pre-Mirandawarning interview to prompt
her confession after her rights had been waived.'
Finally, the majority reflected on the public policy implications of its
ruling.67 The instant court questioned the validity of the Mirandawarning
if such an interrogation tactic were permitted.68 Troubled by the resulting
lack of incentive to warn, the majority further noted that police officers are
being trained in this interrogation technique.69 After concluding that this
technique was a deliberate violation of Appellant's constitutional rights,
the instant court reversed Appellant's conviction and remanded the case
for a new trial.7"
The dissent attacked the majority view as a contradiction of the binding
precedent of Elstad.7 Quoting heavily from Elstad, the dissent believed
that the reading of Appellant's Miranda rights served to cure the prewarning omission. The dissent then attacked the majority's reliance upon
the "improper tactics" language of Elstad, asserting that no evidence was
presented to prove a purposeful violation of Appellant's rights.73
Concluding that strategic deception was distinct from coercion,74 the
dissent would have found the post-Miranda warning confession
admissible.75

the fact that she was subjected to a nearly continuous interrogation, which began without a proper
Miranda warning." Id. at 706 n.4.
64. Id.at 706.
65. Id.Adding that the Elstadcourt found no "improper tactics," the instant court found that
"the breach of Miranda was intentional and part of a tactic to elicit a confession." Id.
66. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d at 706.
67. See id at 706-07.
The instant court described this interrogation as an "end run" around Miranda,which
68. Id.
rendered the warning "meaningless." Id.at 707.
69. Id
70. Id
dissenting).
71. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d at 708 (Benton, J.,
72. Id.(Benton, J., dissenting).
dissenting).
73. Id. at 709 (Benton, J.,
dissenting). "Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic
74. Id. at 709-10 (Benton, J.,
Ploys to mislead a suspect or lull [her] into a false sense of security that do not rise
deception ....
to the level of compulsion or coercion to speak are not within Miranda'sconcerns." Id.at 710
(quoting Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990)).
dissenting).
75. Id. at 711 (Benton, J.,
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In its opinion, the instant court referred extensively to the public policy
goals of the Mirandaruling, such as the deterrence of objectionable police
conduct.76 The MirandaCourt sought to curtail these practices by placing
limitations on custodial interrogation and those tactics used to secure a
suspect's confession.77 However, the Court specifically stated that all
confessions are not inadmissible,78 adding that volunteered statements of
any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment.79
The practical effect of Miranda has been that of a bright-line rule:
statements made during custodial interrogation prior to the administration
of the Miranda warning are generally inadmissible,80 while statements
made after those rights are waived are generally admissible.81 The instant
court's decision, however, has blurred that bright-line by holding
Appellant's confession inadmissible despite her clear waiver of Miranda
rights.82 The instant court has instead held that certain police practices
operate to negate an intelligent and voluntary waiver of those rights.8 3
Elstadinvolved a similar omission of the Mirandawarning,84 but the
instant court insisted that the dissimilar outcomes rest on the distinction
between the unintentional Mirandaviolation in Elstadand the intentional
violation in the instant case.85 However, the importance of this distinction
is questionable, as articulated by the First Circuit in Esquilin 6

76. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d at 703. Other stated goals included the assurance of "trustworthy
evidence, specifically evidence that has not been obtained in circumstances that appear to be
coercive." Id.
77. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,447 (1966). Without such limitations, the Court
feared that such practices would continue unchecked by the law. Id.
78. Id. at 478. The Court stated: "Confessions remain a proper element in law enforcement."
Id.
79. Id.
80. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,300-02 (1985) (holding that a suspect's pre-warning
confession was excluded because he had not been warned of his Mirandarights); United States v.
Esquilin, 208 F.3d 315,318-19 (1 st Cir. 2000) (stating that the government did not attempt to admit
suspect's pre-warning statement, conceding that the statements were in violation of Miranda).
81. See Miranda,384 U.S. at 479 (stating that a suspect may "knowingly and intelligently
waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement").
82. Missouri v. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d 700, 706 (Mo. 2002).
83. Id. The instant court held that the interrogating officer's tactics rendered Appellant's
waiver involuntary. Id.
84. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 300-01. Respondent was arrested at his home, but he was not
warned of his Mirandarights until he was brought to police headquarters. Id.
85. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d at 704.
86. United States v. Esquilin, 208 F.3d 315, 320 (lst Cir. 2000).
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The First Circuit was not persuaded that a deliberate violation of the
Miranda warning constitutes per se improper tactics. 7 Furthermore, the
Esquilin court found that Elstad had not intended to create a distinction
between improper and coercive as Appellant asserted.88 Thus, the
deliberate withholding of Appellant's Mirandawarning did not rise to the
level of coercion, and the post-warning statement was admissible. 9
The instant court rejected this analysis, finding that an improper
interrogation technique was sufficient to bar Appellant's post-Miranda
confession.9" In the instant case, the interrogating officer secured
Appellant's confession prior to the reading of her Miranda rights, then
encouraged her to repeat the confession once she had waived those
rights. 9 The instant court believed this technique was meant to weaken
Appellant's ability to exercise her constitutional rights,9" rendering her
subsequent waiver meaningless.93
However, the Elstad Court specifically rejected the idea that once a
suspect has confessed, the psychological impact of the confession renders
further statements involuntary.94 The Court characterized such a
confession as the release of a "guilty secret" rather than the result of
coercion.95 If the suspect has made a rational decision whether to waive or
invoke his or her rights, he or she is free to confess that secret again.96
Thus, the holding of the instant case seems to be in contradiction with the
holding in Elstad.
By examining interrogating officer's subjective intent in withholding
Appellant's Miranda rights, the instant court determined that improper

87. See id. Appellant had attempted to categorize the intentional violation of Mirandaas the
"improper tactic" described in Elstad.See id.
88. See supra text accompanying note 53.
89. Esquilin, 208 F.3d at 321.
90. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d at 706.
91. See supra text accompanying note 4.
92. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d at 705.
93. Id. at 706.
94. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 311 (1985). The ElstadCourt noted that such a finding
would paralyze the ability of law enforcement to interrogate. Id.
95. Id. at 312. The Court concluded:
There is a vast difference between the direct consequences flowing from coercion
of a confession by physical violence or other deliberate means calculated to break
the suspect's will and the uncertain consequences of disclosure of a"guilty secret"
freely given in response to an unwarned but noncoercive question, as in this case.
Id.
96. Seeid at314.
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tactics had been used by the interrogating officer.9" The instant court
reasoned that had the omission been accidental, as in Elstad, the
subsequent confession would be admissible.98 In contrast, the interrogating
officer in the instant case readily admitted that he hoped to secure a
confession from Appellant before her rights were read to her.99 The instant
court believed that this tactic was sufficiently egregious to render
Appellant's post-warning confession inadmissible. 0°
However, in Esquilin, the First Circuit took the opposite approach,
finding the interrogating officer's intent to violate Mirandairrelevant.'0 '
The First Circuit reasoned that without additional coercive conduct, the
subjective intent of the officer by itself does not undermine the suspect's
free will.'0 2 The suspect is free to invoke his right to remain silent
regardless of this intent.'0 3 Under the logic of the instant court, future
courts would be forced to weigh the subjective intent of the interrogating
officer to determine whether post-Mirandastatements are admissible.
In its desire to find Appellant's post-Mirandaconfession inadmissible,
the instant court has weakened the Miranda decision rather than
strengthened it. Mirandacreated a bright-line rule allowing a suspect to
voluntarily waive his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination.'0 4 The language of Elstadindicates that the admissibility of
a suspect's statement turns on its voluntary nature.'0 5 So long as no
coercion is involved, Mirandarights may be waived following a curative
administration of the warning.'0 6 Scrutinizing the subjective intent of law
enforcement officers who fail to properly warn a suspect would greatly
hinder the investigative process, an outcome specifically shunned by the
Mirandacourt. 0 7 Ultimately, the only intent in question should be that of
the suspect, not law enforcement.

97. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d at 704.
98. Id. The instant court reasoned that if the Mirandawarning preceded the interrogation, this
would be a "perfectly legitimate technique." Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 706.
101. United States v. Esquilin, 208 F.3d 315, 321 (1st Cir. 2000).
102. See supra text accompanying note 54.
103. Esquilin, 208 F.3d at 321. The First Circuit stated that Appellant's own sense that his
initial statement had "let the cat out of the bag" did not qualify as coercion. Id.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 80-8 1.
105. See supra text accompanying note 38.
106. See supra text accompanying note 36.
107. See supra text accompanying note 27.

